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A
mAbstract
This paper presents results from an impact analysis of the Ticket to Work (TTW)
program, as implemented by the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 2002
through 2007. For new, young Social Security Disability beneficiaries, we use
exogenous variation in the month of Ticket mailing to rigorously estimate impacts
of TTW on beneficiary outcomes over a 48-month period following the start of Ticket
mailings in the beneficiary’s state. We find substantial impacts on enrollment for
employment services with TTW-qualified providers, but no consistent evidence of
impacts on the number of months in which beneficiaries did not receive benefits
because of work, or on other outcomes.
JEL classification: H55; I38
Keywords: Ticket to Work; Social Security disability benefits; Impact analysis; Voucher;
Employment services1. Introduction
The Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance system in the United States (OASDI, com-
monly known as Social Security) offers disability insurance benefits to three groups of indi-
viduals: workers who experience long-lasting medical impairments that prevent work at a
substantial level (disabled workers), Disabled Adult Children (DAC) and Disabled Widow
(er)s of other Social Security retired, deceased or disabled workers1. Collectively, these
groups are called Social Security Disability (SSD) beneficiaries2. Many SSD beneficiaries
with low SSD benefits also receive benefits from a separate welfare program, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), which is administered by the same agency, the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA). In 2011, more than 9.8 million people received SSD benefits.
Many SSD beneficiaries are able and willing to work at some level; most of those
who work earn too little to lose their benefits. Recognizing this, the Ticket to Work
and Work Improvement Incentives Act of 1999 (Ticket Act) put into place a number
of new policies and programs designed to encourage beneficiaries’ return-to-work ef-
forts. The leading initiative is the Ticket to Work (TTW) program. Initially, the Social
Security Administration (SSA) mailed each eligible disability program beneficiary a
“Ticket” that he or she could assign to either a state vocational rehabilitation agency
(SVRA) or to a prequalified local rehabilitation service provider, called an employment
network (EN), in exchange for employment placement, job training, and otherStapleton et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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comes for the beneficiary. TTW was designed to expand the service options available
to beneficiaries and create greater incentives for providers to help beneficiaries earn
enough to forgo benefits.
TTW was rolled out in three phases. A first set of states completed the TTW rollout
in 2002 (Phase 1), a second set in 2003 (Phase 2), and a final set in 2004 (Phase 3). In
July 2008, SSA significantly changed the regulations governing TTW to attract more
providers and reflect a more flexible return-to-work concept; hereafter, we call the pre-
2008 program the “original” program.
Previous attempts to estimate impacts of TTW provide inconclusive evidence. The
earlier analyses were, in essence, based on annual trends in differences for mean service
enrollment, earnings and benefit outcomes across the three phases (Thornton et al.
2007; Stapleton et al. 2008). Results were inconclusive, because methodological issues
made it impossible to discriminate between potentially very small, yet important im-
pacts of TTW and pre-existing trends in the differences across phases for earnings and
benefit outcomes. A number of alternative strategies were attempted in recent years to
estimate Ticket impacts, but were also found to be inadequate4.
In this article, we present results from a rigorous new analysis of the impact of
the introduction of the original TTW program, incorporating multiple innovations
relative to earlier efforts. The analysis exploits a feature of the initial TTW rollout
in each phase: just before the start of the rollout, SSA selected the month in which
it intended to mail each eligible beneficiary’s Ticket in an essentially random fash-
ion. We use variation in the intended mail month to rigorously estimate how the
timing of Ticket mailing affects beneficiary outcomes over the following 48
months, then use the estimates to draw inferences about impacts of TTW (versus
no TTW) over the same period. The new analysis also takes advantage of improve-
ments in the measurement of work related outcomes from administrative data,
namely a monthly indicator of benefit suspension or termination for work (STW)
and a count of months in nonpayment status after STW (NSTW months) and be-
fore returning to current-pay status, attainment of the full retirement age (FRA),
or death (NSTW months)5. This article focuses on impacts for NSTW months as
well as for two intermediate outcome variables: enrollment for employment ser-
vices with an SVRA or EN, and an event that must precede STW: completion of
the trial work period (TWP)6,7.
The analysis focuses on the subgroup of beneficiaries for whom we expect impacts to
be easiest to detect: young (ages 18 to 39 at award), new SSD-only beneficiaries—that
is, those awarded SSD recently who are not also receiving SSI. Recent research suggests
that TTW had the most promise of having impacts on work outcomes for this group
(Liu and Stapleton 2011, Mamun et al. 2011, Stapleton et al. 2008). We assumed that if
we found no substantial evidence of impacts on key outcomes for this group, we could
be reasonably confident that there would be no evidence of impacts if we applied the
same approach to other groups. If instead we found evidence of positive impacts for
this group, we could extend the methodology to see if the same approach produced
positive evidence for other groups. The focus on new beneficiaries also allowed us to
exclude those who received awards before July 1999, when there was a significant
change in how earnings affect benefits.
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related to the three outcomes. Each question concerns the impact of duration from the
month before the rollout start in the beneficiary’s state to the month in which SSA
mailed a Ticket to the beneficiary (the beneficiary’s “mail month”) on outcomes over
the 48 months after the rollout start.
 Was enrollment for employment services and completion of TWP less likely to
occur as of 12, 24, 36, and 48 months after rollout start the longer the duration
from rollout start to mail month?
 Was the number of NSTW months as of 12, 24, 36, and 48 months after rollout
start smaller the longer the duration from rollout start to mail month?
We then use the findings to indirectly answer the question of most interest to
policymakers:
 What was the impact of mailing Tickets as of 48 months later versus not mailing
Tickets at all?
We also assess whether TTW was self-financing by 2007, before the new regulations
took effect.2. Data and methods
2.1. Ticket research file
We used data from the 2007 Ticket Research File (TRF07). The TRF is a set of analytic
administrative data files constructed for the TTW evaluation. The TRF07 contains
current and historical information on more than 22 million SSD beneficiaries or SSI
recipients who received a benefit in at least one month from January 1996 through
December 2007 (Hildebrand et al. 2009)8. For the purpose of this study, we constructed
an analytic file for those awarded benefits from 1999 through 2003, based on the
month that SSA first paid a benefit to the awardee9.2.2. Analytic samples
2.2.1. Sample selection
The sample includes beneficiaries first awarded SSD benefits from July 1999 through
October 2003. For the analysis, we followed each beneficiary for 48 months starting
with the first month of the rollout in the beneficiary’s state. As the Phase 3 rollout
started in November 2003, the last month in the sample is October 2007. We limit the
analysis to this period because of factors external to the introduction of TTW. We
started with July 1999 SSD awardees because this is the month in which the non-blind
substantial gainful activity (SGA) level was increased from $500 to $700. We end the
follow-up period in 2007 because of the severe recession that started in the last quarter
of 2007 and because SSA made substantial changes to TTW regulations in 2008 that
may have affected beneficiary outcomes in 2008 and later.
The results reported here use analysis samples that consist of young (ages 18 to 39 at
award) SSD-only awardees who were first paid SSD benefits no earlier than July 1999
and were selected for the initial rollout of the TTW program on two of the three initial
Ticket selection dates: October 26, 2002 (Phase 2), or October 18, 2003 (Phase 3)10. It
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quent rollout month (hereafter, the “intended mail month” [IMM]), to be determined
by the terminal digit of the beneficiary’s SSN. Table 1 provides the sample sizes for each
phase by IMM. Both phases follow identical 11-month schedules, except separated by
12 months, and mailings were uniformly distributed across 10 of the 11 rollout months,
with the second month being the exception. As shown in Table 1, SSA mailed the vast
majority of these Tickets on the IMM. Because the last four digits of SSNs are random
conditional on age, the IMMs are essentially random. Thus, for each phase, we treat
the samples defined by IMM (hereafter, the “IMM samples”) as randomly assigned sam-
ples of those included on the phase’s selection date. This random assignment provided
us with an exogenous source of variation—a variation over which the beneficiaries had
no control—in the timing of Ticket mailing relative to program rollout start in each
phase, which we use to identify the impacts of duration to Ticket mailing on benefi-
ciary outcomes. As described later, the methodology also addresses the fact that some
Tickets were not mailed on the IMM.
We also produced results for young, new SSD-only awardees selected for TTW
rollout on January 12, 2002 (Phase 1), but two features of the Phase 1 rollout sub-
stantially limit their value. The first such feature is that the Phase 1 sample had to
be split into two relatively small samples because an operational issue led to differ-
ent rollout schedules for New York (NY) and the rest of the Phase 1 states: the
respective sample sizes in these two sample groups were 12,023 and 43,080, com-
pared to 77,161 in Phase 2 and 114,657 in Phase 3. A second reason is that the
rollout periods in Phases 2 and 3 (11 months in each) were substantially longer
than in either part of Phase 1 (nine months in NY and five months in the rest of
Phase 1). The larger samples and longer rollout periods in the later phases contrib-
ute substantially to the ability of the methodology to detect small impacts. The
Phase 1 findings do not contradict or illuminate the findings reported here, so
have been omitted for brevity11.Table 1 Sample sizes by intended mail months in phases 2 and 3

















1 Nov–02 10 7,573 97.46 Nov–03 21 11,531 99.85
2
3 Jan–03 12 7,733 95.93 Jan–04 23 11,328 94.13
4 Feb–03 13 7,679 95.86 Feb–04 24 11,539 93.89
5 Mar–03 14 7,745 95.36 Mar–04 25 11,569 93.22
6 Apr–03 15 7,743 94.56 Apr–04 26 11,523 93.04
7 May–03 16 7,778 94.33 May–04 27 11,533 92.39
8 Jun–03 17 7,598 94.04 Jun–04 28 11,434 92.21
9 Jul–03 18 7,826 93.05 Jul–04 29 11,519 91.67
10 Aug–03 19 7,681 92.98 Aug–04 30 11,253 91.42
11 Sep–03 20 7,805 92.68 Sep–04 31 11,428 90.79
Total 77,161 114,657
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Although SSA actually mailed Tickets on the IMM for most beneficiaries, for a small
fraction the actual mail month (MM) did not correspond to the IMM. The TRF records
include the actual mail date, making it possible to determine the MM. Across the two
phase-samples, in 93 to 95 percent of the cases the MM is the IMM. Although the frac-
tion of Tickets mailed on the IMM was very high in each month of the rollout, it did
decline in successive months. One reason for the decline is a provision of the regula-
tions called “Ticket on demand” ; beneficiaries in each phase could request a Ticket
in advance of their mail date, and beneficiaries assigned to later IMM had more
opportunity to make such requests a Ticket than those with early IMM. In
addition, as the rollout progressed, SSA identified some beneficiaries who had died
or were no longer in current-pay status, and consequently did not mail these bene-
ficiaries their Tickets (see Table 2). Because mailing a Ticket on demand, mortality,
and loss of current pay status for some other reason are likely predictive of the
outcome variables, we made adjustments to the methodology to avoid confounding
the correlation of these factors with the outcomes with the impacts of mailing the
Ticket, as described in Section 2.3.
One other issue is that, in each phase, for a small share of beneficiaries (about 4.7
percent in each phase) the state of residence for the beneficiary obtained from the TRF
was not among the states included in the phase’s rollout (Table 1). We do not know de-
tailed reasons, but there are several possibilities: SSA included people in neighboring
states that were served by a field office located in a state within the phase group; the
state shown in the data reflects an address that is not the beneficiary’s own; or the
beneficiary at some point moved to a non-phase state, but SSA did not know of this
move on the selection date. Because we are aiming to retain as much of the original
IMM sample as possible for the analysis, and because we found little variation in the
percentage of the sample in each of these states across the mail months within phase,
we did not exclude these cases12.Table 2 Correspondence of actual mail months (MM) and intended mail months (IMM)
Phase 2 Phase 3
Actual mail month is—
Before rollout 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Before IMM, during rollout (ticket on demand) 3,355 4.35% 6,307 5.50%
Corresponds to the IMM 73,008 94.62% 106,938 93.27%
After IMM, during rollout 224 0.29% 39 0.03%
After rollout 51 0.07% 173 0.19%
Missing mail date
Status as of IMM 523 0.68% 1,200 1.06%
Deceased 433 0.56% 973 0.85%
Suspense/termination for work 2 <0.01% 3 <0.01%
Other suspense/termination 85 0.11% 204 0.18%
Current pay 3 <0.01% 20 0.02%
Total 77,161 100.00% 114,657 100.0%
Not resident of phase state 3,615 4.69% 5,418 4.72%
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In Table 3, we present characteristics of the beneficiaries in the two phase samples. Al-
most all of the characteristics are defined as of the beneficiary’s Ticket selection date.
The exceptions are the primary disabling conditions, measured at SSD award date; the
primary insurance amount, which is the earliest recorded value; and the indexed
monthly earnings, also the earliest recorded value. The beneficiary populations vary
somewhat across phases, as reflected in modest differences in means. Compared to the
Phase 2 sample, the Phase 3 sample has relatively fewer African Americans (16 percent
versus 21 percent), more Hispanics (12 percent versus3 percent), higher indexed
monthly earnings ($1,125 versus $1,090) and Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)13 ($643
versus $632), and more beneficiaries with major affective disorders (18 percent versus
16 percent). Some of the differences reflect the fact that the Phase 3 rollout started 12
months after the Phase 2 rollout, so beneficiaries in Phase 3 had aged a year between
the Phase 2 Ticket selection date and their own selection date, and more new awardees
were added to the Phase 3 sample during the same period. For instance, compared to
those in the Phase 2 sample, as of the selection date, they were older (mean of 34.3 ver-
sus 33.7) and had been on the rolls longer (mean of 26 months versus 18 months). In
addition, those in the Phase 2 sample were more likely to have: previously enrolled for
services, started the TWP, completed the TWP, experienced a month of suspension or
termination for work, and become eligible for Medicare. In addition, some differences
are expected between Phases 2 and 3 because of differences between the economic,
policy and cultural environments for states in each phase.
Table 3 also presents tests of the statistical equivalence of the IMM samples within
each phase. The statistical equivalence tests for each phase’s sample were conducted by
running linear regressions of each characteristic on a set of IMM indicators for the
months within that phase, without an intercept. For each regression, we conducted a
joint test (an F-test) for the hypothesis that all of the population coefficients are equal.
In conducting the test, we treated each state in the phase as a cluster and allowed for
heteroscedasticity in the regression disturbance14. The F-tests show that we would re-
ject the null hypothesis of “no difference” across IMM samples within phase for a large
number of characteristics. Substantively, however, even when a baseline characteristic
is found to be statistically different across IMM samples within a phase, variation in the
means across the IMMs is not substantial, and does not appear to be correlated with
the IMM. For example, in Phase 2, we found significant differences in mean beneficiary
age at Ticket selection date across IMMs, but the difference between the maximum
and minimum mean is 0.19 years around a mean for the phase of 33.70. There are also
significant differences for some baseline values of the outcome variables. Most notably
in Phase 2, 19.1 percent of beneficiaries had previously been found eligible for SVRA
services, and the range of this percentage across the IMM was 1.8 percent. The distri-
bution of the sample across states in each phase is not shown in Table 3 for brevity,
but there were no statistically significant differences in state of residence by IMM for
either phase15.
We consider the IMM samples in each phase to be substantively very similar even
though the joint tests indicate that they are not statistically equivalent in many regards.
The differences likely reflect the fact that the method SSA used to assign IMM was not
purely random, particularly with respect to age and factors that are associated with age.
Table 3 Beneficiary characteristics: means by phase and intended mail months
Phase 2 Phase 3
Mean Rangea Testb Mean Rangea Testb
Gender
Male 0.521 0.020 0.523 0.015 ***
Gender missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age at selection date 33.697 0.192 *** 34.31 0.21 **
Age at disability onset
Age 27.963 0.343 ** 27.96 0.29 ***
Age missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Race/ethnicity
Asian 0.009 0.005 *** 0.026 0.004
African American (non-hispanic) 0.209 0.012 0.156 0.011 ***
Hispanic 0.032 0.006 0.119 0.011 ***
American Indian/Hawaiian 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 **
White [ref] 0.728 0.016 ** 0.667 0.013 **
Other 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.003 ***
Missing 0.012 0.004 0.017 0.004
Education at selection date
Less than high school [ref] 0.187 0.016 *** 0.152 0.014 ***
High school graduate 0.391 0.015 0.374 0.013 ***
More than high school 0.185 0.018 *** 0.204 0.012 ***
Missing 0.238 0.013 0.270 0.014 ***
Expectations about medical improvement
at selection date
Expected 0.039 0.009 0.028 0.004
Possible 0.548 0.015 *** 0.601 0.014 ***
Not expected 0.180 0.016 *** 0.196 0.011 *
Missing 0.233 0.013 0.175 0.014 ***
Medicare eligibility at selection date
[ref = not eligible]
Eligible 0.646 0.011 0.779 0.015 ***
Eligibility missing 0.031 0.006 0.018 0.004 ***
Number of dependent beneficiaries
at selection date
No dependent [ref] 0.455 0.017 *** 0.478 0.017 **
1 0.171 0.011 ** 0.163 0.010 ***
2 or more 0.265 0.012 0.249 0.013 ***
Missing 0.108 0.012 ** 0.110 0.007 ***
VR services before selection date
Determined eligible for VR services 0.191 0.018 *** 0.207 0.010
VR service eligibility missing 0.761 0.024 *** 0.760 0.011
Outcome achieved before ticket selection date
TWP start before ticket selection 0.063 0.010 *** 0.084 0.010 **
TWP completion before ticket selection 0.038 0.007 *** 0.048 0.007 **
STW before ticket selection 0.018 0.004 0.025 0.005 **
Months between SSD award and selection date 18.496 0.224 26.352 0.540 ***
Stapleton et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 7 of 242014, 3:6
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/6
Table 3 Beneficiary characteristics: means by phase and intended mail months
(Continued)
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA, $)
Mean PIA 626.9 18.8 * 643.3 12.3 ***
PIA missing 0.125 0.011 ** 0.123 0.009 ***
Indexed Monthly Earnings (IME, $)
Mean IME 1089.6 45.8 1124.9 28.4 ***
IME missing 0.192 0.009 0.185 0.008 **
Primary disabling conditions at SSD award
Major affective disorders [Ref] 0.155 0.018 *** 0.184 0.015
Other psychiatric disorders and mental retardation 0.241 0.019 ** 0.241 0.017 ***
Back disorders and musculoskeletal system 0.120 0.009 ** 0.111 0.011 ***
Other physical disabilities 0.482 0.027 *** 0.463 0.017 ***
Missing 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
SSD award year
1999 0.097 0.005 0.077 0.009 ***
2000 0.328 0.012 0.258 0.009
2001 0.300 0.012 * 0.293 0.014
2002 0.250 0.013 0.232 0.016 ***
2003 0.015 0.004 *** 0.128 0.015 ***
2004 0.009 0.003 * 0.012 0.003 ***
State unemployment rate
Mean in 6 months around IMM (percent) 5.710 0.385 *** 6.007 0.511 ***
Change in 6 months around IMM 0.079 0.843 *** −0.255 0.264 ***
Anomalous sequence of events
Ticket selection before SSD award 0.036 0.008 ** - -
TWP completion before start 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 ***
STW before TWP start 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ***
STW before TWP completion 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ***
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Ticket Research File 2007.
Note: “Ref” indicates the reference category for the discrete variable in the multivariate regression models.
a“Range” is the difference between the minimum and maximum mean across IMM in each sample.
b“Test” shows the results from the test of the null hypothesis that the means are the same across IMM in the sample;
*, **, and *** indicate significantly different at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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critically, for the occurrence of the outcome events prior to Ticket selection date.
2.2.4. Outcome measures
The outcome measures are based on the 48 months starting with the first rollout month
for the phase (month zero is the pre-rollout month). This period ends September 2006 for
Phase 2, and September 2007 for Phase 3. For each individual in the sample we report re-
sults for:
 Two binary “event” variables. We determined when in the 48 months following
start of rollout each of the following events occurred, if at all: (1) enrolled for
employment services (assigned their Ticket to an EN or were determined eligible
for services by an SVRA); and (2) completed their last TWP month. In the analysis
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or 48), we define a binary variable for each event that is equal to one if the event
occurred after the rollout start and before that month, and zero otherwise.
 NSTW months, a count of the number of months in nonpayment status following
STW that occurred during the 48-month period. NSTW months include all months
after benefits are suspended or terminated for work until the first of the following
events occurs: (1) return to current-pay status, (2) suspension or termination for
some other reason, or (3) the end of the 48-month period. Beneficiaries are not
necessarily engaged in SGA during all NSTW months; we know only that they are
not receiving benefits.
Means for the outcome variables in the IMM samples as of month 48 are presented
in Table 4. The overall mean for Phase 2 is higher than Phase 3 for service enrollment,
but the opposite is true for the other two outcomes. These differences reflect state dif-
ferences in beneficiary characteristics, the labor market, and the support system, as well
as the 12-month difference in time period.Table 4 IMM sample percentages experiencing four events by end of month 48 after
rollout start
Service enrollment TWP completed NSTW months
Mean (%) SE Mean (%) SE Mean (months) SE
Phase 2 6.78 0.09 8.08 0.10 1.460 0.024
Nov–02 7.25 0.30 7.88 0.31 1.412 0.074
Dec–02
Jan–03 6.91 0.29 8.33 0.31 1.470 0.075
Feb–03 6.72 0.29 7.96 0.31 1.597 0.079
Mar–03 6.75 0.29 7.64 0.30 1.394 0.072
Apr–03 6.70 0.28 8.69 0.32 1.483 0.075
May–03 6.78 0.28 8.15 0.31 1.472 0.074
Jun–03 6.69 0.29 8.08 0.31 1.542 0.079
Jul–03 6.45 0.28 8.01 0.31 1.448 0.074
Aug–03 6.46 0.28 8.06 0.31 1.357 0.072
Sep–03 7.07 0.29 7.99 0.31 1.423 0.075
Phase 3 5.67 0.07 8.24 0.08 1.686 0.021
Nov–03 5.90 0.22 8.33 0.26 1.645 0.065
Dec–03
Jan–04 5.73 0.22 8.76 0.27 1.750 0.068
Feb–04 5.84 0.22 8.22 0.26 1.617 0.064
Mar–04 5.67 0.22 8.17 0.25 1.641 0.065
Apr–04 5.39 0.21 8.17 0.26 1.668 0.066
May–04 5.54 0.21 8.45 0.26 1.756 0.067
Jun–04 6.09 0.22 8.26 0.26 1.733 0.068
Jul–04 5.55 0.21 7.78 0.25 1.675 0.067
Aug–04 5.46 0.21 8.17 0.26 1.672 0.066
Sep–04 5.57 0.21 8.12 0.26 1.703 0.067
Note: “Mean” shows the mean percent experiencing the event or the mean NSTW months over the first 48 rollout
months; SE is the standard error of the estimated mean.
Stapleton et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 10 of 242014, 3:6
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/6The variation in service enrollment rates across IMM within each phase is consistent
with a negative impact of duration to the mail month on enrollment as of month 48.
For instance, for Phase 2, service enrollment declines from 7.25 percent for November
2002 to 7.07 percent for September 2003; the corresponding figures for Phase 3 are
5.90 and 5.57 percent. These differences are not statistically significant, however. The
variation in means across IMM within each phase for other outcomes is not clearly
consistent with negative impacts for those outcomes.
2.3. Estimation approach
2.3.1. Identification strategy
For each phase of the TTW rollout, SSA selected the IMM for all beneficiaries who
were eligible on the phase’s Ticket selection date—approximately one month before
rollout began. SSA used the terminal digit of the beneficiary’s SSN to determine the
rollout month in which SSA would mail the beneficiary a Ticket. Because the last four
digits (the serial numbers) of SSNs are considered to be random after conditioning on
age16, this strategy essentially led to random assignment of the eligible beneficiaries to
IMMs, after controlling for age. Consequently after controlling for age we assume that
variation in the duration from the rollout start to the IMM is exogenous to each of the
outcome variables (that is, independent of other unobserved factors that might affect
outcomes). This provides the foundation for estimating the impacts of the duration
from Ticket rollout start to the IMM on later beneficiary outcomes.
We used the exogenous assignment of IMMs to identify the impacts of delaying ac-
tual Ticket mail month (MM) on beneficiary outcomes while accounting for a limited
number of non-random deviations of the MM from the IMM. We hypothesize that the
longer the duration from rollout start to the MM the lower the expected value for each
outcome variable—enrollment in vocational services, completion of the TWP, and the
number of NSTW months. The estimated impact of delaying the MM is expected to be
different from the direct, intent-to-treat (ITT) impacts of delaying the IMM, and is
likely to be of greater interest to policymakers17. The difference might be substantial
because we are relying on random variation in duration from rollout start to the IMM
to identify impacts, and the later a beneficiary’s IMM, the greater the likelihood of an
adjustment to the actual MM. To produce these estimates, we use the IMM variables
as instrumental variables (IV) for the MM variables18.
2.3.2. Instrumental variables estimation
To estimate the impact of actually mailing the Ticket on each outcome, we applied an
IV approach to the following model:
MMi ¼ θIMMi þ τXi þ vi ð1Þ
Eit ¼ βt ’MMi þ yt ’Xi þ uit ð2Þ
where MMi is a vector of dummies for the actual mail month; IMMi is a vector of dum-
mies for the IMM; Eit is a dummy variable for whether the event has occurred for
beneficiary i as of month t following the rollout start, or is the number of NSTW
months experienced by beneficiary i as of month t following the rollout start; Xi is a
vector of baseline control variables, vi and uit are zero mean, residual terms; and t = 12,
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(1) represents a set of equations, one for each mail month, and θ and τ are both matri-
ces. There is no intercept, because Xi contains an exhaustive set of state indicators. For
Equation (2), we restricted the coefficients of the exhaustive set of MM indicators to
sum to zero in order to avoid exact collinearity. This normalization means that the co-
efficient for each MM indicator is the predicted impact of Ticket mailing in that MM
relative to mailing on the average MM during the rollout period (approximately 6.4 for
both samples) (Suits 1984). In other words, the normalization allows us to test the esti-
mated impacts of mailing Ticket in each MM relative to the impact of mailing in the
average MM.
Although we call MMi the actual mail month indicator vector, it does not indicate
the actual mail month for every observation, because a small share of Tickets were
never mailed, and an even smaller share were mailed shortly after the rollout window
(that is, after the last month represented in MMi). In coding MMi, we had to choose
one of the rollout period mail months for each of these observations in order to keep
them in the sample. For each case, we chose a virtual month that is assumed to be con-
sistent with the individual’s actual behavior. For the bulk of such cases—those never
mailed a Ticket because of benefit termination prior to their IMM—we used the actual
IMM on the assumption that had SSA proceeded to mail their Ticket on their IMMs,
their behavior would have been the same as their actual behavior. That seems very
likely, because they would have received their Ticket after they could no longer use
them, and a large majority were deceased. For the very small share of cases in which
the Ticket was mailed a few months after the rollout ended (0.07 percent for Phase 2
and 0.19 percent for Phase 3, as shown in Table 2), we chose the last rollout month;
that is, we coded these late mailing cases as if their Tickets were mailed a few months
earlier than they were actually mailed.
Two assumptions must be satisfied for IMMi to be a set of valid instruments.
First, conditional on Xi, IMMi must be uncorrelated with the disturbance terms in
Equations 1 and 2. Second, again conditional on Xi; IMMi must be correlated with the
MMi. (Angrist et al. 1996). Both assumptions are satisfied in our case. The first as-
sumption is plausible because SSA assigned IMM in a fashion that was exogenous with
respect to the individual’s characteristics after conditioning on age; thus, by design,
IMMi is independent of any unobserved individual characteristics. Further, the IMM se-
lected could have no effect on the outcomes of interest except through its effect on the
actual mailing of Tickets. The second assumption is satisfied because the vast majority
of Tickets were mailed on the IMM (see Table 1). Hence, taken together, the IMMs
constitute valid instruments for estimating the impact of the actual MM on beneficiary
outcomes. Further, they are a very strong set of instruments, in that the correlation be-
tween the IMM and MM variable for each mail month is quite high, reflecting the fact
that the IMM and MM are identical in the vast majority of cases. This is also reflected
in the very large F-statistic from the first stage of IV estimation for each endogenous
MM, which ranged between 537 and 1,507 for Phase 2, and between 484 and 971 for
Phase 3 for the MMs in each phase.
We assume that the residual terms in Equations 1 and 2 have a state component that
is independent across states and an individual component that is independent across
individuals. Hence, we estimated each equation using adjustments for clustering at the
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of the nature of the dependent variables. To test the null hypothesis that duration to
MM has no impact on an outcome, we tested the hypothesis that all of the mail-month
coefficients are zero. For each outcome, we also tested the hypothesis that the marginal
impact of delaying the mailing of the Ticket an additional month was the same throughout
the rollout period (that is, that there is a linear relationship between duration to mail
month and the expected outcome). We used a chi-square test in each case.3. Findings
We present the IV estimates for the impacts of duration from rollout start to MM on
service enrollment, TWP completion, and NSTW months graphically in Figure 1. Each
panel in the figure shows the estimated impacts for each MM for the samples in Phase
2 (left panel) and Phase 3 (right panel). The mean value of the 10 point estimates in
each phase is zero, by design; each point estimate measures the expected outcome for
the sample mailed a Ticket in the corresponding month relative to the overall mean
outcome for all those in the phase sample after accounting for pre-rollout characteris-
tics and the fact that not all Tickets were mailed on schedule. In addition, we have plot-
ted 95 percent confidence intervals around each point estimate (the short vertical line
through each X) as well as the line obtained by constraining the IV estimates to fall on
a straight line. The slope of the trend line indicates how much each one-month delay
in mailing the Ticket affected the outcome. We also present two test statistics at the
bottom of each panel: the first test statistic shows the result for the joint test of the null
hypothesis that all the estimated IV coefficients are zero, and the second is for the lin-
ear restrictions on the coefficients.3.1. Clear evidence of impacts on service enrollment
As seen from the top panel of Figure 1, in both phases we found strong evidence of
negative effects of duration to MM on service enrollment at 12 months following roll-
out start in Phase 2 and Phase 3 (that is, the longer the duration, the lower the propor-
tion enrolled). For both phases, the confidence intervals for the point estimates are
narrow, the estimates steadily decline with duration, the data strongly reject the hy-
pothesis that they are all zero, and fail to reject the hypothesis that the true values lie
on a straight line. For Phase 2, the slope of the trend line is−0.084, indicating that each
one-month delay in mailing the Ticket reduced the percentage enrolled in services as
of month 12 by an estimated 0.084 percentage points, with a 95 percent confidence
interval of ±0.033. Extrapolating to 12 months, the estimated impact on service enroll-
ment at month 12 of mailing the ticket in month one versus not mailing it at
all‒‒which is equivalent to the projected impact of a delay from month one to month
13‒‒is 1.0 percentage points (−0.084 × 12). The estimates suggest that the impact on ser-
vice enrollment for Phase 3 was somewhat smaller than for Phase 2. The point estimate of
the slope of the trend line is -0.066 (±0.025), and the projected impact on service enroll-
ment at month 12 versus not mailing it at all is 0.8 percentage points. The difference be-
tween the Phase 2 and Phase 3 slopes is not statistically significant, however.
We found more limited evidence of impacts on service enrollment at 24, 36, and 48






































Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
Phase 3 SRV12 (IV)
Slope of Line =-0.084, SE =0.017, p-value < 0.001 Slope of Line = -0.066 SE = 0.013, p-value < 0.001
Zero Coefficients: Chi-sq(9) = 49.68, p-value < 0.001 Zero Coefficients: Chi-sq(9) = 51.2, p-value = 0.001
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Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
Phase 3 TWPC48 (IV)
Slope of Line =-0.007, SE = 0.034, p-value = 0.842 Slope of Line =-0.041, SE = 0.019, p-value = 0.03
Zero Coefficients: Chi-square(9) = 21.11, p-value = 0.012 Zero Coefficients: Chi-square(9) = 23.02, p-value = 0.006







































































































Slope of Line =-0.00595, SE = 0.00603, p-value = 0.324 Slope of Line = 0.00549, SE = 0.00541, p-value = 0.309
Zero Coefficients: Chi-square(9) = 17.85, p-value = 0.037 Zero Coefficients: Chi-square(9) = 22.88, p -value = 0.006
Linear Impacts: Chi-square(7) = 9.04, p -value = 0.250 Linear Impacts: Chi-square(7) = 14.43, p -value = 0.044
Figure 1 IV Estimates for impacts of duration to MM on service enrollment at 12 months, TWP
completion at 48 months, and NSTW months at 48 months following rollout start, phases 2 and 3.
Notes: IV using IMM as instruments for MM. All estimates are constrained to sum to zero. The vertical line
on each coefficient shows the 95 percent confidence interval. The line shows the estimates with linear
restrictions imposed on the coefficients. The first test statistic is for the test of the null hypothesis that all
the coefficients are zero, and the second is for the linear restrictions on the coefficients.
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the duration from rollout start to the observation month (see Stapleton et al. 2013 for
details). This is consistent with expectations; as each month goes by, those mailed
Tickets late in the rollout period have more time to catch up to those mailed Tickets
earlier in terms of service enrollment. Thus, it appears that, on average, an early MM
accelerated the beneficiary’s entry into service enrollment relative to a later MM, but
service enrollment for those with later MM had, by the end of the observation period,
largely caught up to enrollment for those with earlier MM.3.2. Unclear evidence of impacts on TWP completion
The middle panel in Figure 1 plots the instrumental variable estimates for impacts on the
likelihood of TWP completion at 48 months after the start of rollout, along with their 95
percent confidence intervals and estimated trend lines. Estimates for TWP completion at
12, 24 and 36 months appear in Stapleton et al. 2013 and are no stronger in terms of evi-
dence of impacts than those at month 48. For both phases, the monthly estimates are
jointly significant at the 5 percent level, but the patterns of monthly coefficients in each
phase do not support the conclusion that their joint significance reflects an impact of dur-
ation to MM on TWP completion. In each phase, the null hypothesis of zero coefficients
is rejected primarily because estimates for two months have relatively large magnitudes
(March and April for Phase 2 and January and July for Phase 3). For Phase 2 the pattern
of the estimates is clearly inconsistent with a negative effect, and the slope of the trend
line is very small and statistically insignificant. For Phase 3, the slope of the trend line is
negative and significant at the 5 percent level, but the hypothesis that the impacts are lin-
ear is rejected at the 10 percent level of significance. This leaves open the distinct possibil-
ity that the estimates for Phase 3 are simply due to chance difference for the January and
July samples rather than to a negative impact of duration to MM on TWP completion.3.3. Unclear evidence of impacts on NSTW months
On the bottom panel in Figure 1, we plot the monthly IV estimates for impacts of duration to
MM on the number of NSTWmonths completed as of 48 months after rollout start. The evi-
dence from Phase 2 for NSTW months is marginally indicative of a substantive impact when
viewed in isolation, but in the context of all of the findings—including lack of evidence for an
impact in Phase 3—it seems equally plausible that the Phase 2 results simply reflect chance.
For Phase 2, the effects of duration to MM on NSTW months as of month 48 are jointly
significant at the 5 percent level (bottom left panel). We do not reject the null hypothesis
that the impact of duration to MM is linear over the rollout period. However, the slope of
the trend line is not very large‒‒it is−0.0059 NSTW months per month of duration to
MM, which translates into a mean effect of−0.07 months for a 12-month delay in mailing
the Ticket, over a 48-month period‒‒and is not statistically significant. For Phase 3 (bot-
tom right panel), we reject the hypothesis that all monthly values are zero at the 1 percent
level, but the slope of the fitted line is positive (0.0055) effects, rather than negative, al-
though not statistically significant. For Phase 3 we also reject the hypothesis that the im-
pact of duration to MM is linear over the rollout period at the 5 percent level. Thus, it
seems likely that the Phase 3 results simply reflect chance rather than an impact of dur-
ation to MM, and chance might equally well explain the Phase 2 results.
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also undermined by the evidence of impacts on TWP completion in the Phase 2 and 3
samples, described previously. We would not expect a negative impact on NSTW
months unless there is a negative impact on TWP completion, as NSTW months can-
not start until the TWP is completed. As described earlier, the evidence for an impact
on TWP completion is very weak and, if anything, stronger for Phase 3 than for Phase
2. If we interpret the point estimates as impacts, we must conclude that an essentially
zero impact on TWP completion for Phase 2 translated into a modest negative impact
on NSTW months, while a modest negative impact on TWP months in Phase 3 trans-
lated into a modest positive impact on NSTW months. An alternative explanation of
these inconsistent results is that they are all due to chance. The analysis of total im-
pacts, presented in the next section, reinforces the conclusion that the marginally sig-
nificant impacts on NSTW months found for Phase 2 are simply the result of chance.3.4. Projections of total impacts of TTW
In this section we present projections of the impact of mailing Tickets in the first roll-
out month versus never mailing them, as of 12, 24, 36 and 48 months later. These are
derived from the estimates for the impacts of the duration to MM at 12, 24, 36 and 48
months under two important, but quite plausible and partially verifiable assumptions.
We call these estimates projections because they rely on two maintained assumptions.
The first assumption is the “linearity” assumption: that the marginal impact of delay-
ing the mailing of the Ticket on each outcome as of month 12, 24, 36, or 48 is linear
through month 13 of the 48-month observation period for each sample. This assump-
tion is clearly consistent with the acceptance of the linearity restrictions for the service
enrollment estimates as of month 12 (shown earlier) as well as analogous restrictions
for months (24, 36 and 48—not shown). Linearity is sometimes rejected for TWP com-
pletion and NSTW months, but in these cases it appears that rejection is due to one or
two outlier estimates; the results for TWP completion at 48 months in Phase 2 and
NSTW months in Phase 3 shown above are illustrative.
The second assumption is the “impact only delayed” assumption: that the impact of
mailing the Ticket on each outcome for those mailed Tickets in month 13 is always
exactly 12 months behind the impact on enrollment for those mailed Tickets in month
one. For instance, the impact of mailing Tickets in month 13 as of month 24, 36, or 48 is
exactly the same as the impact of mailing the Ticket in month one as of month 12, 24, or
36, respectively. This assumption is clearly consistent with the service enrollment point
estimates for months 24, 36 and 48, which are progressively smaller than impacts at
month 12, and which suggest that service enrollment for those mailed Tickets late in the
rollout had essentially caught up to service enrollment for those mailed Tickets earlier
(see Stapleton et al. 2013). This assumption is also not contradicted by the evidence for
other outcomes, although for those outcomes there is not consistent evidence of impacts.
Figure 2 illustrates how these assumptions are used to derive the projections for total
impacts over the 48-month period after Ticket mailing on an outcome at 12, 24, 36,
and 48 months after rollout start, using estimates for service enrollment impacts for
Phase 2. Given the assumptions, the solid line traces the impact of delaying the mailing































Months Since Rollout Start
Impact if Mailed in Month 1 Impact if Mailed in Month 13
Figure 2 Illustrative computation of the projection for the total impact of mailing the Ticket on an
outcome in month 48 (service enrollment, phase 2).
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24, 36, and 48. The length of the vertical double arrow represents the impact of delay-
ing the mailing from month 1 to month 13 at each observation point. The sum of the
estimated impacts of mailing the Ticket at month 13 instead of month 1 as of months
12, 24, 36, and 48 (illustrated by the lengths of the four vertical arrows) is the total im-
pact as of month 48 of mailing the Ticket in month 1 versus not mailing it at all.
We applied this approach to all outcome variables in both phase samples. As illus-
trated in Figure 2 and shown in Table 5, the projected impact on service enrollment at
month 48 for Phase 2 is 2.3 percentage points and statistically significant. The corre-
sponding projection for Phase 3 is a more modest 1.2 percentage points, but also sig-
nificant. Another feature of the service enrollment projections is that the point
estimates increase with the projection month in each phase—reflecting the maintained
assumptions and the fact that the restricted IV estimates of all coefficients in the dur-
ation to MM models are positive. Further, for Phases 2 and 3, the increment to the pro-
jection diminishes with each 12-month period, as we would expect.
None of the projections for total impacts on other outcome variables are significant at even
the 10 percent level as of any observation point. The NSTW-months estimates stand in stark
contrast to those for service enrollment—the latter with uniformly positive point estimates and
significant at the 0.10 level or better. These projections reinforce our earlier conclusion that
there is no evidence of a substantial impact on any outcomes other than service enrollment.3.5. Assessment of whether TTW was self-financing by 2007
The fact that we did not find statistically significant impacts on NSTW months does
not by itself rule out the possibility that TTW under the initial regulations had impacts
on these outcomes that were sufficiently large for the program to be “self-financing”—
that is, for savings from a net reduction in benefits to be sufficient to pay for TTW pay-
ments to providers and all administrative costs attributed to the program. Thornton (2012)
Table 5 Projected total impacts on service enrollment, TWP completion and NSTW
months as of 12, 24, 36 and 48 months, by phase
Sample and observation month Service enrollment TWP complete NSTW months
Phase 2
12 1.004*** −0.070 −0.017
z-stat. 4.895 −0.326 −1.114
24 1.736*** −0.058 −0.033
z-stat. 4.395 −0.125 −0.661
36 2.038*** −0.016 −0.009
z-stat. 3.514 −0.021 −0.087
48 2.319*** 0.064 0.062
z-stat. 3.047 0.058 0.329
Phase 3
12 0.791*** −0.202 −0.005
z-stat. 4.674 −1.070 −0.353
24 1.028*** 0.040 −0.035
z-stat. 3.153 0.098 −0.783
36 1.137*** 0.408 −0.074
z-stat. 2.369 0.609 −0.769
48 1.210* 0.899 −0.140
z-stat. 1.876 0.936 −0.824
Note: “z-stat” is the standard normal test statistic for the hypothesis that the projected impact is zero; *, **, and ***
indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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beneficiaries experiencing suspension or termination for work (STW) for the first time
in each year—might be sufficient for the program to be self-financing. Because this
issue is critical to policymakers, in this section we assess in more detail whether the
estimates are consistent with the self-financing hypothesis.
An impact of 3,000 is quite small relative to the number of first-time STW cases ac-
tually observed in any recent year. Based on findings in Schimmel et al. (2013) and add-
itional tabulations of their data, we estimate that an impact of 3,000 first STW cases is
about five percent of the number of first STW cases in 2007 that would have occurred
in the absence of TTW. An increase in STW of five percent would be sufficient for
TTW to be self-financing only if NSTW increases by at least the same relative amount;
if instead those who attain STW as the result of TTW return to the rolls quickly rather
than accumulating NSTW months, reductions in benefits would be minimal.
Under certain strong assumptions, we could conclude that a TTW impact of five per-
cent or greater on NSTW at 48 months for new, young SSD-only beneficiaries would
be large enough to have made the program self-financing in 200719. The most problem-
atic assumption is that 2007 can be interpreted as a steady state with respect to the
number and characteristics of beneficiaries and their work activity. That assumption is
required to interpret a cross-sectional impact of five percent in 2007 as the equivalent
to a longitudinal impact of five percent for recent program entrants. In fact, 2007 was
far from a steady state, primarily because the number of program entrants in the period
leading up to 2007 was far larger than the number exiting the program. Because recent
entrants are much more likely to enter STW and start to accumulate NSTW months
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conclude that the longitudinal percentage impact on NSTW months for recent entrants
would have to be substantially higher than five percent in order to achieve a cross-
sectional impact of five percent in 2007.
For now, however, we treat the five percent figure as a lower bound and test the fol-
lowing hypothesis: the mailing of Tickets to young, new SSD-only beneficiaries in-
creased the number of NSTW months as of month 48 after the mailing by at least five
percent versus the alternative hypothesis that the impact was less than five percent. We
then consider how the results would change if the minimum percentage impact con-
sistent with self-financing was larger than five percent, as it might well be.
We use the projected total impacts in Phase 2 and 3 separately, and then, to increase
power, we pool the results for the two phases on the assumption that the true relative
impacts for the two phases are the same. The pooled projection is the minimum vari-
ance projection under the assumption that percentage impacts were the same for
Phases 2 and 320. Because of the inequalities in the null and alternative hypotheses, a
one-tailed test is appropriate. Results appear in Table 6. We also show tests for the null
hypothesis of “no impact” versus the one-tailed alternative of “positive impact”.
The statistical power of the projections for NSTW months is insufficient to rule out the
possibility that TTW had impacts of at least five percent for Phases 2 and 3 pooled, but at
the same time the evidence from these projections more consistent with zero or negative
impacts than an impact of 5 percent or more. The percentage projections themselves are
all smaller than 5 percent, and both the Phase 3 and pooled projections are negative (-8.0
percent and−3.4 percent, respectively). We cannot, however, reject the null hypothesis of
a 5 percent impact based on the pooled sample (p-value of 0.14). Note, though, that the
p-value for that test is much smaller than the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis
that the true impact is zero or negative (0.67 percent). That is, the evidence is more consist-
ent with the hypothesis of a zero or negative impact than with an impact of at least 5 percent.
As indicated above, the fact that 2007 followed a period of rapid program growth leads
us to conclude that the smallest percentage impact for young SSD-only entrants that is
consistent with self-financing is larger than five percent. If we had used a larger value in
the tests above, the results would clearly be less favorable to the hypothesis of self-
financing. For instance, a value of nine percent would lead to rejection of the hypothesis
of self-financing at the five percent significance level using the pooled data. That is, if self-
financing required at least a nine percent impact on NSTW months—a plausible value—
we would have to reject the hypothesis that TTW was self-financing as of 2007.Table 6 Projected relative impacts on NSTW months at 48 months after Ticket mailing
Phase 2 Phase 3 Pooled
NSTW months
Projected relative impacts at 48 months 4.1% −8.0% −3.4%
Standard error of relative impacts 12.5% 9.7% 7.7%
P-value for test of “no impact (or negative impact)” versus “positive impact” 0.371 0.795 0.673
P-value for test of “impact of 5.0% (or more)” versus “impact less than 5.0%” 0.471 0.090 0.136
Notes: The relative projected impacts were calculated by comparing the projected total impacts on NSTW as of 48
months and the estimated means in the absence of TTW ccounterfactual). For each outcome, the counterfactual mean
was estimated by subtracting the weighted mean of the Phase 2 and 3 impact estimates at 48 months from the actual
mean for the phase. The p-values are for one-tailed tests, reflecting the inequalities in the hypotheses.
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We find clear evidence that the mailing of Tickets during the rollout period did in-
crease service enrollment. The most important findings are captured in their implica-
tions for the impact of Ticket mailing, versus no Ticket mailing, on service enrollment
over the next 48 months. The Phase 2 and 3 findings are very significant and consistent
with each other. The Phase 2 point estimates imply that the impact of mailing Tickets
is 1.0 percentage points 12 months later, and 2.3 percentage points 48 months later.
The corresponding estimates for Phase 3 are 0.8 and 1.2 percentage points. All of these
estimates are very significant statistically. They are also large relative to what service
enrollment would have been in the absence of ticket; the 48-month estimates imply
relative impacts on the order of 50 percent and 25 percent for the two phases, respect-
ively21. The point estimates are quite comparable to results from earlier impact analysis
for SSD-only beneficiaries under age 40: a 0.6 percentage point increase in service en-
rollment by the end of the rollout year and a 1.5 percentage point increase at the end
of the following year (Thornton et al. 2007; Stapleton et al. 2008). Another feature of
the findings is that, by month 48 after rollout start, service enrollment for those mailed
Tickets late within each rollout period had essentially caught up with service enroll-
ment for those who were mailed Tickets earlier in the rollout period.
The analysis provides no consistent evidence of impacts on other outcomes. Some es-
timates for Phase 2 are suggestive of an impact, but it seems likely that they are due to
chance. Specifically, marginally significant Phase 2 point estimates for NSTW months
imply that a 12-month delay in mailing a Ticket decreases the number of NSTW
months as of month 48 by an average of 0.07 months—approximately a five percent de-
crease22. There are, however, substantial reasons to believe that these results are simply
due to chance. The fundamental reason is the multiple comparisons problem; whenever
an evaluation produces impacts for many outcomes, there are bound to be a few statis-
tically significant findings by chance alone even if the intervention has absolutely no
impacts. We have produced impact estimates for many different outcomes (not all in-
dependent), so we would expect to find that some estimated impacts beyond those for
service enrollment would be statistically significant even if there are no impacts on
these outcomes. Hence, to assess whether the Phase 2 results for NSTW months reflect
real impacts or simply chance, it is important to consider them in the context of all the
estimates produced—are the latter consistent with real impacts for these outcomes in
Phase 2?23 In brief, the Phase 3 point estimate for the impact on NSTW months as of
48 months is positive, that is in the opposite direction found for Phase 2, and just as
large. It is very hard to understand why comparable impacts on service enrollment in
the two samples would translate into such different impacts for NSTW months. Fur-
ther, the point estimates for the impact on TWP completion—a necessary precursor to
accumulation of NSTW months—at 48 months is essentially zero for phase 2 and
negative for Phase 3. Examination of the plots of coefficients for individual MM in
Section 3 reveals that outlier estimates for early and late rollout months appear to ex-
plain the estimated relationship between duration to MM and TWP completion for the
two phase samples, rather than the impacts of Ticket mailing.
Although we have considerable confidence that the methodology provides unbiased
estimates and can detect impacts as small as those found for service enrollment, we
have also illustrated that its power is not sufficient to rule out the small positive
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in 2007. Overall, however, the evidence is more consistent with no impact on NSTW
months than with an impact large enough to make the program self-financing24.
The findings suggest that the early impacts of delaying Ticket mailing on service en-
rollment did not translate into impacts on TWP completion and NSTW months. There
are several possible explanations of this apparent disconnect. One is that TTW just in-
creased observed service receipt without increasing actual service receipt; because we
only observe service enrollment with TTW-qualified providers (SVRA and EN), it
might be that the expansion in providers resulted in an increase in receipt of services
from TTW-qualified providers, but with no impact on total service receipt. Another
possible explanation is that new services were provided to beneficiaries who were about
to give up their benefits for work anyway. Findings from other research show that a
large majority of beneficiaries forgo benefits for work without enrolling for services
within SSA’s system (Schimmel et al. 2013). For such beneficiaries, the expansion of ser-
vice availability under TTW represented an opportunity to obtain more services with-
out changing their NSTW months. The nature of this opportunity is most apparent in
the case of ENs offering “consumer-directed services”; these ENs pass through a large
share of any payments received to the beneficiary. Services provided under TTW by
other types of providers presumably also have substantial value to the beneficiary, even
if they do not result in more NSTW months.
Our findings help explain the decline in the number of ENs accepting Ticket assign-
ments from 2004 through 2007: they could not cover their costs from Ticket revenues
alone. Because SSA payments to TTW providers are closely tied to the number of
NSTW months its clients accumulate, a provider is unlikely to cover its cost unless it’s
typical client accumulates many NSTW months, its costs are extremely low, or it has
significant revenues from other sources. TTW providers during this period did receive
some payments based on NSTW months, but our analysis suggests that this is primarily
because they accepted Tickets from some clients that would have had NSTW months
even in the absence of the TTW program; they were not able to increase the number of
NSTW months of their clients. Thornton’s (2012) analysis of the economic viability of
ENs confirms that, with the possible exception of consumer-directed ENs, providers were
not able to cover their costs from ticket revenues alone during this period.
It is important to keep in mind that these estimates are for TTW under the original
regulations. Reflecting concerns about the limited use of Tickets by beneficiaries and
declining provider interest in Tickets, SSA attempted to rejuvenate the program by
implementating significant regulatory changes in July 2008. The revisions: (1) increased
the payments providers were eligible to receive from SSA if their clients achieved cer-
tain earnings milestones without giving up their benefits; (2) increased the maximum
amount that most providers are eligible to receive; (3) shortened the minimum period
over which providers could receive the maximum amount from 60 months to 36
months; and (4) endorsed the use of the consumer-directed service model.
The 2008 regulatory changes clearly stimulated provider interest and the number of
beneficiaries assigning their Tickets (Schimmel et al. 2013). The number of providers
that accepted at least one ticket nearly doubled from 2007 through 2011. New enroll-
ments for services under all three of SSA’s payment systems—TTW’s two new payment
systems and a well-established cost-reimbursement system that continued to be available
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from 2005 to 2007, and enrollments under the new payment systems alone increased by
377 percent.
In principle, the regulatory changes and consequent large growth in provider and
beneficiary participation could have had a positive impact on NSTW months among all
beneficiaries. However, it appears impossible to rigorously measure any such impact be-
cause the new regulations were implemented nationwide in July 2008, just as the econ-
omy was plunging into the deepest and longest recession since the 1956 inception of
disability benefits under Social Security. Schimmel et al. (2013) found that the number
of beneficiaries experiencing their first NSTW month fell from 74 thousand in 2007 to
53 thousand in 2009. It might be that the overall decline in beneficiaries experiencing a
first NSTW month would have been worse in the absence of the regulatory changes,
but we do not know. It might also be that the recession, rather than the regulations, ex-
plains much of the increase in TTW participation; the recession no doubt made it
more difficult to find jobs for many beneficiaries attempting to return to work, and
some might well have sought assistance from a TTW provider as a result.
Our impact analysis for the pre-2008 period provides a lesson for SSA and other
agencies when, in the future, they are asked to make a significant change to a large na-
tional or state program—including significant future changes to TTW. Inasmuch as
such a change often requires a lengthy rollout period, the agency should consider the
knowledge that might be gained by implementing a rollout in which program partici-
pants are randomly assigned an implementation month over a period of 12 months or
so. This approach has its limits, however; it will not necessarily have sufficient power
to identify substantively important impacts if such impacts are very small. Power can
be increased if the program participants most likely to be affected by the change can be
identified in advance, the rollout period can be lengthened, or a more extreme version
of the change could be applied to randomly chosen participants. Such enhancements
make this approach more like the approach that would be best from a purely methodo-
logical perspective: a randomized control trial.Endnotes
1DAC receive benefits on the basis of a parent’s entitlement as a “primary benefi-
ciary”—a parent who is a disabled worker, retirement beneficiary, or deceased worker.
The DAC must be deemed unable to work as of the age of 22 under the same medical
criteria applied to disabled workers, he or she is not entitled to benefits until the parent
is entitled. Each disabled widow(er) beneficiary (DWB) receives benefits on the basis of
the entitlement of a deceased spouse; the DWB must be at least 50 years old as well as
meet the same medical criteria as disabled workers. DAC and DWB benefits are paid
out of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Trust Fund if the primary benefi-
ciary is a disabled worker, or out of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust
Fund if the primary beneficiary is a retiree or deceased. See SSA (2012) for further
details.
2Because the analysis presented in this report includes SSDI disabled worker benefi-
ciaries as well as DAC and DWB, and benefits for most of the latter are not paid from
the SSDI Trust Fund, we use SSD to encompass all three groups.
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provider and the provider may contact SSA to verify eligibility.
4A brief discussion of these alternative strategies is available in Stapleton et al. 2013.
5“Current-pay” status means that the individual is eligible for a cash payment for the
current month.
6During the TWP, SSD beneficiaries are permitted to work and earn at any level with-
out loss of benefits, provided that they continue to meet the medical eligibility require-
ments. The TWP consists of 9 months, which need not be consecutive—any 9 months
in a 60-month rolling window are counted. After completing the TWP, beneficiaries
enter an extended period of eligibility (EPE). Except for a 3-month grace period, indi-
viduals who engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) in any of the next 36 months
have their benefits suspended for that month. The beneficiary is entitled to full benefits
during any month of this period when he or she is not engaged in SGA, provided that
benefits have not been terminated for medical recovery or some other reason. After 36
months, SSD benefits are terminated in the first month of SGA after use of any
remaining grace period months.
7We also analyzed two other outcomes‒‒starting the TWP, and first month of benefit
suspense or termination for work (STW)‒‒but their results are not essential to under-
stand the key impacts of the TTW program. The results for these outcomes are avail-
able in Stapleton et al. 2013.
8Extracts from several Social Security administrative files were merged to create the
TRF, including the Master Beneficiary Record, Supplemental Security Record, Numerical
Identification System (Numident) file, the 831 and 832/33 Disability files, the Disability
Control File, monthly snapshot files, and files from the payment history update system.
9The first payment month (that is, the award month) is that in which the first pay-
ment was actually made, which is usually after the first month for which the beneficiary
is entitled to a benefit (that is, the entitlement month). The latter is often used in SSA’s
statistics to classify beneficiaries by entry year (for example, SSA 2009). We use the
award month instead because our focus is on the activities of beneficiaries once they
become informed of their award and are entitled to use the DI work incentives.
10SSA determined all beneficiaries who were eligible to receive a Ticket and who re-
sided within the phase’s states as of the phase’s selection month. Almost all SSD benefi-
ciaries and SSI recipients over age 18 were eligible; the main exceptions were (1) new
beneficiaries with a status of medical improvement expected (MIE) who had not yet
had their first medical continuing disability review (medical CDR) and (2) child SSI re-
cipients who had reached age 18 and were waiting for redetermination as adults.
11The Phase 1 findings are reported in Stapleton et al. (2013).
12With a small number of cases in the “out-of-phase” states in each phase, the ran-
dom variation at the state level may explain a substantial fraction of the variation in
some characteristics across IMM samples. We address this issue in footnote 14 in the
next section.
13The PIA is an amount based on past earnings that determines the benefit amount.
For disabled worker beneficiaries, the PIA is the worker’s benefit amounts, and quali-
fied dependents receive an additional fraction of this amount. For DAC and DWB, the
PIA is based on the parent or spouse’s past earnings and the benefits are a fraction of
the amount.
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phase” states, each of which is treated as a cluster, it is conceivable that they might be
substantially influencing the results of the joint tests of statistical equivalence. To ex-
plore this, we conducted the joint tests without correcting for state-level clustering
(but adjusting for heteroscedasticity) and found that we would reject the null hypoth-
esis for far fewer characteristics. We suspect that with a small number of cases in the
nontargeted states in each phase, the random variation in the cluster component of the
model’s error term explains so much variation in some characteristics that tiny differ-
ences across IMM groups are found to be significant. But this is just conjecture, and
we are not aware of any technical problem with including a set of clusters with very
small samples along with clusters that are much larger.
15These statistics are available in Stapleton et al. (2013).
16The serial numbers in SSNs are considered random only after conditioning on age
because they are historically assigned in sequence (Barron and Bamberger 1982).
17Estimates of direct impacts of delaying the IMM on beneficiary outcomes are avail-
able in Stapleton et al. 2013.
18As stated earlier, in order to address the fact that some Tickets were never mailed
because benefits were suspended or terminated prior to the IMM, we coded the MM
for those observations as if the Tickets were actually mailed on the IMM. We had pre-
viously verified that, with almost no exceptions, termination or suspension of benefits
had occurred for reasons other than work—most commonly mortality. Our reasoning
for this modification is that mailing the Ticket to these beneficiaries during any month
of the rollout would almost certainly have had no impact on their employment out-
comes, in which case essentially all outcomes would have been the same as those ob-
served had SSA mailed all of these Tickets in their IMM.
19These assumptions are described and assessed in more detail in Stapleton et al.
(2013, Appendix D).
20The minimum variance estimate is a weighted mean of the estimates for the two
phases where the weights have been chosen to minimize the variance of the estimate.
More weight is given to the Phase 3 estimate for each impact because the Phase 3 esti-
mate has lower variance than the Phase 2 estimate.
21We used 4.5 percent as the counterfactual value for both phases, based on the fol-
lowing calculations. The percentages enrolled at 48 months for the two phases are 6.8
and 5.7 percent. If we assume that as of month 48 the impacts for those mailed Tickets
in later rollout months had caught up with impacts for those mailed Tickets in the first
month, then these percentages would have both been 4.5 percent if the Ticket had
never been mailed (6.8 – 2.3 and 5.7 – 1.2, respectively). The actual values are 51.1 and
26.7 percent larger than 4.5 percent, respectively.
22The mean of NSTW months as of month 48 in Phase 2 is1.46 months.
23There are formal ways to address the multiple comparison problem (see Schochet
2008, 2009). We have not conducted a more formal analysis because so few estimates
other than those for service enrollment are even marginally significant.
24It is also possible that TTW had a positive impact on earnings, even if it did not re-
sult in an increase in months with earnings above the SGA level, as required to have an
impact on NSTW months. The lack of an evidence for an impact on TWP completion
suggests that any such impact did not have a substantial impact on the number of
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the SGA amount ($640 in 2007 compared to $900 for SGA). This conclusion is rein-
forced by a finding reported in Stapleton et al. (2013): that TTW had no significant im-
pact on starting the TWP.
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